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 Health Law, Brexit and Medical Devices: a question of legal regulation and 
patient safety 
 
Jean V. McHale, Birmingham Law School, University of Birmingham. 
 
Abstract:  
Brexit is already posing many major challenges for those concerned with health and social 
care.   This paper explores one area, that of the regulation of medical devices which has been 
fundamentally underpinned by EU law and asks what Brexit means for future regulation in 
the UK. The paper provides the first detailed legal examination of the impact of Brexit for 
medical devices regulation.  Section two of the paper outlines the current EU regulation of 
medical devices. It explores questions such as the role of the normative bodies, the problems 
of lack of central regulation and the role of vigilance processes. Section three explores the 
options for medical device regulation post Brexit in the light of the ongoing reform of the law 
in this area and the implementation of new EU Regulations. It considers the prospects for 
reciprocity and for alignment in the future. The paper concludes by arguing that while the 
new  system for regulation of medical devices in the EU is not perfect it nonetheless provides 
an important opportunity for restructuring device regulation and providing greater 
opportunities for facilitating safety. It is important to ensure that as far as possible   we do not 
lose such an opportunity at domestic level post Brexit. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Medical devices are one of the relatively unsung categories of medical miracles with a huge 
impact on patient lives. From cardiac pacemakers to hip prostheses to pregnancy tests the 
technology has improved and greatly facilitated individual health1. However over the last 
decade some medical devices have been at the heart of major health controversies. The PiP 
silicone breast implant scandal provides one such notable example2. Poly Implant Prothese 
(PiP), a French company manufactured breast implants. These were sold directly, or in some 
instances through intermediaries, having been rebranded across some 65 countries.  PiP used 
industrial grade silicone rather than medical silicone in the production of breast implants. A 
high level of ruptures of the implants subsequently took place.  
In March 2010 the Agence Francaise de Securite Sanitaire des Products de Sante decided to 
recall the implants from the market. They also suspended further market placement, 
distribution or use.  The following month the EU Commission informed Member States about 
the situation and asked them to put measures in place to prohibit market placement, 
distribution or use of PiP implants and to inform relevant health care professionals. 
Subsequently civil litigation and prosecutions followed.3 
 
                                                            
1 To the extent to which that some devices can be seen as part of the evolution of integrated human beings and 
machines see M.Quigley and. Ayihongbe  “Everyday Cyborgs: On Integrated Persons and Integrated 
Goods”[2018] 26(2) Medical Law Review 276. 
2 It should be noted that PiP was not the first scandal concerning silicone breast implants- see 
see generally C. Greco “The Poly Implant Prothese breast prostheses scandal: Embodied Risk and Social 
Suffering” (2015) 147 Social Science and Medicine 150, Department of Health, Poly Implant Prothèse (PIP) 
breast implants: final report of the Expert Group (Department of Health, June 2012):  M. Latham “If it aint 
broke don’t fix it”: Scandals, Risk and Cosmetic Surgery” [2014] 22(3) Medical Law Review 384. 
3 “French breast implant firm PIP's founder jailed” The Guardian 10th December 2013.  BBC News “PIP implant 
scandal: German firm ordered to pay damages” 14th November 2013. 
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More recently reports have highlighted the risks of and potential harms from the use of metal 
on metal hip implants.4  Initially when these were marketed the National Institute of Health 
and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in the UK stated that clinicians who were advising patients 
on this should ensure that patients “understand that less is known about the medium to long 
term safety and reliability of these devices or the likely outcome of revision surgery than for 
conventional hip replacements.5” Subsequently safety concerns have been raised regarding 
their reported higher failure rates of the De Puy minnacle metal on metal hip implants. There 
were also allegations of “metal poisoning.6” Litigation is currently ongoing in the UK 
regarding these implants. In June 2017 the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory 
Agency issued guidance on follow-up and patient management with the aim of ensuring swift 
detection of problems.7 Recent controversy also relates to the use of vaginal mesh implants, 
called by some “the new Thalidomide”.8 These have been used as a means of attempting to 
address incontinence problems caused after childbirth but it is alleged that this led to major 
complications with disintegration of the plastic mesh or it cutting into organs. Common side 
effects have included chronic pain infections, loss of sexual intimacy and also in some cases 
women have been left unable to stand or walk properly. This area is currently under review 
by both the Scottish and English governments and in July 2018 it was announced that use of 
vaginal mesh implants in England was suspended.9 What these incidents graphically illustrate 
                                                            
4 C.Heneghan, D.Langton and M. Thompson “Ongoing Problems with metal on metal hip implants “(2012) 344 
British Medical Journal. 
5 National Institute for Clinical Excellence The Clinical Effectiveness and the Cost Effectiveness of metal on 
metal hip resurfacing” NICE (2000). 
6 See the discussion and call for future research in Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified 
Health Risks Opinion on The Safety of Metal-on Metal joint replacement with a particular focus on hip 
implants” Adopted at plenary of 24-25th September 2014. 
7 Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency ‘Medical Device Alert: All metal-on-metal (MoM) hip 
replacements: updated advice for follow-up of patients’ (29 June 2017) at https://www.gov.uk/drug-device-
alerts/all-metal-on-metal-mom-hip-replacements-updated-advice-for-follow-up-of-patients. 
8 “Vaginal mesh to treat organ prolapse should be suspended, says UK health watchdog” The Independent, 15th 
December 2017. 
9  BBC News “ Mesh Implant Campaigners “Betrayed” by Reports Publication”  23rd March 
2017,http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-39408064; “Alison Britton to Report on the review of 
transvaginal mesh implants”, http://www.scottishlegal.com/2017/05/19/alison-britton-to-report-on-scottish-
governments-review-of-transvaginal-mesh-implants/: The Guardian “Jeremy Hunt launches review into 
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is that safety of medical devices is   clearly critical for patients. Consequently equally critical 
are the regulatory mechanisms which are put in place to ensure such safety along with the 
way in which clinicians make decisions regarding their use.  Within this paper the focus is on 
the former issue.   
 
Medical devices are one of the many areas of health law which will be impacted by the UK’s 
withdrawal from the EU.  Currently UK medical device regulation is structured through the 
prism of three EU Directives.10    These are first, Directive 90/385/EEC which concerns 
implantable medical devices including such things as cardiac pacemakers. Secondly, 
Directive 93/42/EEC a general Directive which concerns medical devices from blood 
collection bags, hip prostheses and powered devices. Thirdly, Directive 98/79/EC concerns in 
vitro diagnostic devices such as pregnancy tests  and  tests for transmissible disease.   
 
Confidence in the regulation of medical devices at EU level was shaken by the PiP scandal. 
Nonetheless while PiP can be seen as a catalyst for reform in reality  this scandal can be seen 
as part of what was and what remains a regulatory continuum. Review of EU law in this area 
was already underway from 2008 although it took almost a decade before two new EU 
Regulations finally came into force in 2017 to replace the three previous Directives. 
Implementation of the new Medical Devices Regulation is to be undertaken in 2020, while 
for the new In Vitro diagnostic devices Regulation implementation is 2022.  It  is perhaps 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
handling of vaginal mesh scandal”, 21st February 2018, 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/feb/21/jeremy-hunt-launches-review-into-handling-of-surgical-
mesh-scandal?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other; BBC News “Vaginal mesh: England review into scale of harm” 
30th January 2018. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health‐42871621 BBC News “Immediate Stop to NHS Mesh 
Operations”, 10th July 2018  https://www.bbc.com/news/health-44763673 
10 See further in relation to medical devices  I. Vinck, F. Hulstaert,  H.V. Brabandt, M. Nyet, S. Stordeur 
“Market Introduction of High Risk Medical Devices: Towards a Recast of the Directive  Concerning Medical 
Devices” (2011) 18 European Journal of Health Law 477. 
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somewhat ironical that it is at the very time when the EU medical devices regulatory system 
is about to be tightened that there is a risk due to Brexit that the UK may end up bereft of 
such a regulatory structure. 
 
Brexit is already posing many major challenges for those concerned with health and social 
care (see further papers in this volume).11  This paper examines the implications of Brexit for 
UK patients and the NHS of the future regulation of medical devices.  It provides the first 
detailed legal examination of the impact of Brexit for medical devices regulation.  Section 
two considers current EU regulation of medical devices with specific focus upon general 
medical devices regulation. Section three explores the options for medical device regulation 
post Brexit, the prospect of a Bonfire of the Regulations and the new EU medical devices 
regulations and  the impact of  a“deal” or “no-deal scenarios”. The paper concludes by 
arguing that while the new  EU system  for medical devices regulation is not perfect it 
nonetheless provides an important opportunity for restructuring device regulation and for 
facilitating safety. It is important to ensure that as far as possible   we do not lose such an 
opportunity at domestic level post Brexit.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
11 See also N Fahy, T Hervey, S Greer, H Jarman, D Stuckler, M Galsworthy and M McKee, ‘How will Brexit 
affect Health and Health Services in the UK? Evaluating Three Possible Scenarios Against the WHO Health 
System Building Blocks’ (2017) 390 The Lancet 2110. 
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II. REGULATING MEDICAL DEVICES FOR QUALITY AND SAFETY: THE ROLE 
OF THE EU 
 
Prior to the  EU’s involvement in the area of medical device regulation the UK developed 
good manufacturing practice guidelines for industry in the 1980’s.12  In addition certain 
devices were also regulated as medicines including contact lenses and intra-uterine 
contraception.13 It was however the involvement of the EU which provided the major drive 
for regulation with different types of medical devices being regulated through EU Directives 
since the 1990’s14.  Nonetheless there has long been a tension in this area between the 
pressures of the market place and those of safety.15  As Hodges has argued the EU system  
“can also be criticized on the ground that the jurisdictional basis of the legislation is 
that of the facilitation of trade rather than of safety. It is true that as with all New 
Approach legislation, the medical devices Directives state that the achievement of a 
high level of health and safety is mentioned in the preamble but this is not strictly 
{the}(SIC) legal basis on which the legislation is founded.”   16 
 
Similarly Flear has argued in the context of new health technologies that the approach 
undertaken by the EU can 
“. . . narrow the meaning and framing of technological risk to being principally 
about product safety at different stages of product development and ultimately 
                                                            
12 See G.R. Higson Medical Devices Safety: The Regulation of Medical Devices for Public Health Institute of 
Physics Publishing (1998). 
13 Hodges at para 17.176. 
14 See T.K.Hervey and J.V.McHale European Health Law Themes and Implications Cambridge: CUP (2015) 
pages 366- 379. 
15 See eg C. Campillo- Artero “A full-fledged overhaul is needed for a risk and value based regulation of 
medical devices in Europe” (2013) 113 Health Policy  38. 
16 See C. Hodges “Do we need a European Medical Devices Agency”? (2004) 12(3) Medical Law Review 268. 
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marketing within the internal market. At the same time the techniques bracket 
off and marginalize the other kinds of harms or hazards to which risk might 
pertain.17 
 
These tensions remain visible in the operation of the Devices regulatory system. This falls 
under the (DG GROW) rather than DG SANTE which concerns health.18  The key factor in 
the regulation of medical devices is that of the award of a “C.E.” mark. This is needed to 
ensure conformity of safety standards. The precise approval process is dependent upon the 
perceived risk level of the Device. So for example, under the Medical Devices Directive there 
are different categories of devices.19  Class I which concerns products which do not 
enter/interact with the body  requires self-certification by the manufacturer.  For three other 
classes a certificate of conformity is required from what is known as a “notified body”. These 
are Class IIa which includes such devices as contact lenses, dental bridges and crowns). 
Second, Class IIb comprises devices such as invasive/implantable device and those which 
interact with the body including maxillo-facial implants.  Thirdly, Class III devices which are 
those which affect function of vital organs eg prosthetic heart valves. Medical implants will 
always fall under Class IIb or Class III.  Critically important is the fact that these notified 
bodies are themselves private companies rather than state regulatory bodies.  As we shall see 
below such an allocation of responsibility has long been very controversial.  
In ascertaining whether quality standards are met  there can be difficulties concerning which 
standard it is proposed to apply. Currently a manufacturer can select to be assessed by any 
standard including those national standards which are in conformity with harmonised EU 
                                                            
17 M. L. Flear, ‘Regulating New Technologies: EU Internal Market Law, Risk, and Socio-Technical Order’ in M 
Cremona, (ed.), New Technologies and EU Law (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2016) at page77. 
18 See eg Professor A. Fraser Evidence submitted to the Health Select Committee, House of Commons 
Implications of leaving the EU for the regulation of medical devices, January 2018. 
19 See further generally C. Hodges “The Regulation of Medicinal Products and Devices” in J. Laing and 
J.V.McHale (eds) Principles of Medical Law (4th ed) (Oxford: OUP, 2017). 
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standards.20 This gives rise to a real risk of problems arising due to the diversity in regulatory 
standards.   
 
In the case of some devices which are specifically “custom made” for the sole use of a 
particular patient CE authorisation is not needed but further specific criteria are required 
including retention of documentation for the competent authority. In addition the 
manufacturer must retain documentation for the competent authority.    Confirmation of 
compliance with essential requirements must be based on clinical data typically the 
compilation of relevant scientific literature or an appropriate written report with critical 
evaluation. In some instances a clinical investigation itself may be required and where this is 
the case this would need  to be undertaken subject to research ethics committee requirements. 
An example here would be the introduction of a completely new form of device into clinical 
practice where the components are previously unknown.  
 
One concern  regarding the  medical devices approval process relates to that of transparency. 
Since 2007 in the USA there has been a requirement that trial studies and results concerning 
medical devices must be published by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  
However there is no such requirement under the Medical Devices Directive. The level of 
information required for device approval is also very different than that needed by 
pharmaceutical regulatory processes. In evidence submitted to the House of Commons 
Science and Technology Select Committee review of medical devices regulation in 2016 by 
the Centre for Evidence Based Medicine it was stated that the amount of clinical evidence 
needed for approval “could be minimal” and that moreover the fact that existing studies 
                                                            
20  See note 19 supra Hodges, para 17.159. 
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published in the literature were accepted “are one of the main drivers of poor quality under-
researched devices on the market today.”21 Similarly the Faculty of Pharmaceutical Medicine 
of the Royal College of Medicine   expressed concern about the use of equivalence data and 
that unpublished safety issues could have arisen concerning devices already certified. Devices 
may be produced with “subtle differences” but not requiring new authorisation meaning that 
certain safety/effectiveness issues may not as a result be explored. In addition as the Faculty 
commented  
“as time goes on each iteration of a device rests its case on a previous iteration, each a 
little different to the next one, after several years devices may be approved that are 
very different to the original marketed devices.”22 
 
Oversight of the operation of the Directives is provided in each member state by a 
“competent authority”, which in the UK is the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory 
Agency.23 The MHRA’s role includes implementation of the Directives’ provisions, 
designating notified bodies, undertaking assessment and authorisation of clinical 
investigation of those devices which are non CE marked. In addition the MHRA has the task 
of investigating adverse events and addressing safety matters such as the recall of devices.  
Since 2015 the MHRA has had its own Devices Expert Advisory Committee.24 In contrast to 
pharmaceuticals however there is no general overarching central approvals process from a 
central European Agency such as the European Medicines Agency nor is there  a 
decentralised process operational at member state level as is currently operated by the MHRA 
in relation to pharmaceuticals. Instead as noted above the actual authorisation of medical 
devices themselves is entrusted to the “notified bodies”.   The use of notified bodies and their 
                                                            
21 House of Commons Science and Technology Committee Regulation of Medical Implants in the EU and UK, 
5th Report of Session 2012-3, HC 163 at para 26 for similar criticisms see  C.Campillo- Artero  n 16 above.  
22 Note 21 supra at para 26. 
23https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/medicines‐and‐healthcare‐products‐regulatory‐agency 
24https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/devices‐expert‐advisory‐committee  
10 
 
operation has long been a very controversial aspect of the Directives.25 It is effectively 
providing regulation via a commercial company operating expressly for this purpose. There 
are clearly dangers in such processes not least the question of effective oversight and 
accountability.    
 
At present there is some engagement at EMA level between devices and medicines 
regulation. This is first because the EMA does have the role of providing scientific opinions 
regarding the quality and safety of medical devices which include medicinal substances 
where these can have an ancillary action on the patient’s body.  In these cases the notified 
body is required to consult the EMA for a scientific opinion.  Secondly, there is also an ad 
hoc European Medicines Agency/Committee for Advanced Therapies and Medical Devices 
Notified Body (EMA/CAT-NB) Collaboration Group concerned with facilitation of some 
parts of Regulation (EC) No. 1394/2007 which deals with advanced-therapy medicinal 
products (ATMPs).26   Such products may be gene therapy medicinal product, a somatic cell 
therapy medicinal product or a tissue engineered product.27 
 
What could appear to be an obvious solution would be to totally align the processes for 
pharmaceuticals and for medical devices28.  This  would provide the EMA with oversight and 
this could be matched by independent oversight from the competent authority at member 
                                                            
25 See note 19 supra. 
26http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/contacts/CAT/people_listing_000086.jsp&mid=WC0b0
1ac058029021c. See also the European Commission Guidelines on Good Manufacturing Practice specific to 
Advanced Therapy Medicinal Products Brussels, 22.11.2017 C (2017) 7694 final. 
 
27  See Regulation (EC) No 1394/2007  of the  European Parliament and the Council of 13 November 2007 
on advanced therapy medicinal products and amending Directive 2001/83/EC and Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 
28  See eg Professor A. Fraser Evidence submitted to the Health Select Committee, House of Commons 
Implications of leaving the EU for the regulation of medical devices, January 2018.  
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state level- for the UK  the MHRA.  However those involved in the medical device industry 
have been strongly opposed to this. It is the case that there are some practical distinctions 
between drugs and devices which inevitably impact upon the precise manner in which their 
safety is reviewed. So for example, it can be argued that clinical trials concerning drugs are 
simply and inevitably practically different- put bluntly it is easier to stop a participant taking 
a trial drug than to remove an implant. Moreover as devices are designed to last several years 
follow up of a device during a trial would take considerable some time. In contrast the  
MHRA have commented that the use of notified bodies use  needs to be seen in the context of 
the sheer scale of the medical devices market with at that time there being some 400,000 
devices across the EU.29. The MHRA also saw an advantage in that notified bodies could 
“specialise in certain areas and react to market demand adding expertise and capacity when 
required which would not be possible for public sector bodies.”30  
 
While the use of notified bodies can be seen as a practical compromise nonetheless concerns 
have been rightly identified over many years as to the lack of conformity in approach taken 
by such bodies across jurisdictions. The number of such bodies varies between member 
states.  That is not by itself necessarily a problem given that this may be reflective of different 
demands for approval from state to state. More worrying is that evidence has emerged over 
time of a lack of consistency in decisions taken by oversight bodies and questions as to the 
effectiveness of the oversight of such bodies. In addition manufacturers have the ability to 
“shop around” between notified bodies. They are able  to select which body to approve their 
device rather than approval being entrusted to a national regulator. This practice is made 
                                                            
29 See note 21 supra. 
30 See note 21 supra at para 11. 
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easier  by the fact that no central database which records approvals.31 This gives rise to the 
very real risk that if some bodies are less rigorous than others certain less scrupulous 
manufacturers may to decide target them. In addition there is some evidence that some 
notified bodies have been prepared to act as consultants to companies to assist them to get 
approval when in fact they are not allowed to do this. 32 
 
In the wake of the PiP scandal investigations a Joint Action Plan was established between the 
EU Commission and the EU member states in 201233. This focused upon the functioning of 
notified bodies, market surveillance co-ordination in relation to vigilance and transparency 
and communication.34 Member states were requested to reinforce market surveillance 35 and 
also to better co-ordinate their activities.36  Voluntary joint audits were undertaken of notified 
bodies by teams drawn from member states and the Commission. While some good practice 
was identified, concerns were also raised as  to the operation of notified bodies.37  These 
included notable variation in internal audits and follow ups, limited or no procedures to deal 
with conflicts of interest,38 evidence of poor documentation and delays39 inadequate 
information supplied to the Commission40, and diversity in the nature of liability insurance 
required. 41 
                                                            
31 See discussion in Campillo-Artero n. 16 supra  at page 40. 
32 See further n. 16 above at  page 40. 
33 Commission Staff Working Document Implementation of the Joint Plan for Immediate Action under the 
existing Medical Devices legislation Brussels 13.6.2014 SWD (2014) 195 final. 
34 Note 21 supra at para 1.4.1. 
35 Note 21 supra at para 1.4.2. 
36  Note 21 supra at para 1.4.3. 
37 See “Restoring Confidence in medical devices. Action Plan after PIP scandal tightened control in Europe. 
European Commission Press Release, 20th June 2014. 
38 Note 23 supra at para 4.3.1. 
39 Note 23 supra at para 4.1. 
40 Note 23 supra at para 4.2. 
41 Note 23 supra at para 4.3.1. 
13 
 
Subsequently the number of such bodies has dropped from some 80 to 56.42 Some certificates 
already awarded were as a result withdrawn. Measures were introduced with the aim of 
addressing some of the problems highlighted in this audit process. In 2013 a Commission 
Implementing Regulation was introduced intending to clarify the criteria which were required 
by notified bodies. 43 Joint audits are now mandatory for new designations and for 
resignations of notified bodies.  The Commission introduced monthly vigilance 
teleconferences with member states. In addition trends concerning safety related incidents are 
now under examination by the EU Commission’s Joint Research Centre in Ispra. As we shall 
see below the new EU medical devices Regulations will further tighten the regulatory 
processes but real concerns regarding the fact that that the approvals themselves are left to 
private sector bodies in this way remain. 
 
Finally, one common method of EU regulatory oversight is the use of databases enabling 
pertinent information to be made available across member states to facilitate safety vigilance 
processes. In the context of medical devices  the current database, “EUDAMED”, was 
established in 2010 and became operational from 2012 with Member States being required to 
enter all data into this by that date.44 Information stored in the database includes that relating 
to manufacturers, authorised representatives and also certificates. It also contains some basic 
data on vigilance and clinical investigations in the form of the title of the protocol and the 
primary objective. This provides an important source of information though as the PiP 
scandal demonstrates its operation does depend upon effective co-operation by notified 
bodies. 
                                                            
42 D. Cohen “Medical devices face tougher premarket testing under new EU laws” (2017) 357 British Medical 
Journal. 
 
43 Regulation (EU) No 920/2013. 
44 Commission Decision 2010/227/EU of 19th April 2010 on the European Databank on Medical Devices 
(Eudamed) Official Journal 1. 102, 23rd April 2010, 45-48. 
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The UK regulation of medical devices is thus underpinned by EU law; however various 
aspects of this regulatory process can be seen as problematic at present.  Could Brexit with its 
prospect of decoupling from EU regulatory regimes provide potential opportunities with the 
development of a new specific UK based scheme or would Brexit itself cause potential risks 
to patient safety in this area in the future? We consider these issues below. 
 
III. MEDICAL DEVICES REGULATION AND THE BREXIT EFFECT 
 
 
At the time of writing and following the Article 50 notification issued by the UK to the EU in 
2017 the UK is due to leave the EU at 11 pm GMT on 29th March 2019. There has already 
been considerable concern expressed by those working in this area as to the impact that 
Brexit may have on the operation of medical device regulation in the future. Medical devices 
and the industry around it have clearly been seen as a matter of some importance by the 
Government.45  However as with many issues concerning Brexit  its precise impact remains a 
matter of considerable uncertainty. This section considers the effect of the possible legal 
alternatives flowing from Brexit. A number of issues are examined in turn.  Will this  in 
principle be seen as  an area for continued regulatory alignment or one for a “Bonfire of the 
Regulations”?  Secondly, if  continued and future alignment is sought then how can this be 
achieved? Here  the new EU devices Regulations which will be fully implemented in 2020 
                                                            
45 So for example, medical devices were included in the list of case studies published by DexEU in 2017 
https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/economy-business/economy-economy/brexit-impact-58-sectors-assessed/ 
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and 2022 respectively are discussed in relation to the impact of a “deal” or “no deal” scenario 
between the UK and the EU. 
 
A Bonfire of the Regulations? 
 
Is it likely that the area of medical devices is one which is subject to a “bonfire of the 
regulations”?  As with other aspects of Brexit  this may be viewed by some as a very real 
opportunity to decouple from EU regulatory processes. In the past there have been 
suggestions by some UK Government ministers that certain EU Regulations in the area of 
health care can be seen as inhibitors of scientific development for example in the context of 
clinical trials. 46  In an article in the British Medical Journal (BMJ) it was reported that 
George Freeman, the UK Life Sciences Minister whose brief includes the Medicines and 
Healthcare Regulatory Agency had written to  Carlos Moedas who is the EU Research, 
Science and Innovation Commissioner. He asked him to“tackle the increasingly 
precautionary‘anti-science’ trend in EU legislation” and this could be seen as deterring 
investment.  Concerns as to such an approach were highlighted in the same BMJ paper by 
Professor Martin McKee, Professor of European Public Health at the London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and a leading international authority on EU health regulation 
who stated that 
“Once again the European Union is prioritising patient safety over the narrow 
interests of industry, protecting us from the policies pursued by our own government. 
We give up this protection at our peril,” 47 
                                                            
46 See eg Michael Gove in the Daily Telegraph 20th Feb 2016. 
 
47  D. Cohen “UK minister lobbied EU for lighter regulation of drugs and devices” (2016) 353British Medical 
Journal, published 15th June 2016. 
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Subsequently other Government ministers have been somewhat more conciliatory and saw 
greater potential for regulatory alignment.  In July 2017 Jeremy Hunt, the  then Secretary of 
State for Health and Greg Clark the Business Secretary writing in the Financial Times 
newspaper about pharmaceutical regulation commented that there was a need to both place 
the safety of patients at the heart of regulation and in addition to   
“provide certainty and long-term stability. Our focus is on supporting initiatives 
across Europe that will be vital to developing the next generation of products — big 
data, genomics and ever greater support for medical research and scientific 
collaborations”48.    
 
The House of Commons Health Select Committee in their 2018 Report| called for the 
Government “to look to secure, as a priority in the next round of negotiations, the closest 
possible regulatory alignment with the EU”. 49The Government White Paper published in 
July 2018 sets out the case for “an economic partnership” which will include “participation 
by the UK in those EU agencies that provide authorisations for goods in highly regulated 
sectors”. It envisages that this would include the European Medicines Agency. There is 
emphasis upon the “deep and special relationship” and the need to protect patients and 
support the UK life science industry.50 While there is no specific reference to medical devices 
in this document the tone of the document is particularly interesting and relevant given the 
relationship between drugs and devices regulation.  
 
 
 
                                                            
48 Financial Times, July 4th 2017. 
49 House of Commons Health and Social Care Select Committee  Brexit: medicines, medical devices and 
substances of human origin Fourth Report of Session 2017–19, para 18. 
50 HM Government The United Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership with the European Union Cm 9417 
(2018) para 37. 
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The new Medical Devices Regulations and the   potential implications of deal or no deal  
 
If  alignment is sought with EU medical devices regulatory processes then how can this be 
achieved? The  UK Government is seeking a transition period as part of its Withdrawal 
agreement. Initially  it indicated that they want such an agreement with the European Union 
which would include a 2 year transition period.51 However the EU took a slightly more 
restrictive approach and currently the transitional period is due to end in December 202052.   
If that remains the case and forms part of the final agreement then the UK during this period 
will remain subject to existing EU law and furthermore need to comply with new EU law 
which is to be implemented during transition.  This raises important practical issues  due to 
the fact that  a new EU Medical Devices Regulation is due to be fully implemented in 2020  
which is discussed below. Moreover as will become obvious full compliance will require 
reciprocity which will require an agreement to be reached with the EU. 
 
 First, the aim of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 is to transpose existing EU law 
into UK law. Thus legal continuity is intended to be assured and medical devices regulation 
within the UK itself would appear to be able to continue as at present undertaken by notified 
bodies.  The 2018 Withdrawal Act only translates certain provisions and by itself cannot 
address a number of practical problems which are likely to emerge in such a situation.  
                                                            
51 “Theresa May asks EU for two-year Brexit transition period” The Guardian, Friday 22nd September 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/sep/22/theresa-may-asks-eu-for-two-year-brexit-transition-period. 
52 BBC News “EU agrees Brexit 'transition' negotiation guidelines” 29th January 
2018.http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-42861496 and see  Annex to the  Council Decision supplementing 
the Council Decision of 22 May 2017 authorising the opening of the negotiations with the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland for an agreement setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal from the 
European Union - Supplementary directives for the negotiation of an agreement with the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal from the European Union,  
XT 21004/18 ADD 1 REV 29th January 2018. 
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Unless there are specific sectoral agreements being made with the EU the UK will be unable 
to participate in those parts of the Devices Directives and subsequently Regulations in the 
future which require reciprocity and cross- EU collaboration.  Indeed the existing Withdrawal 
agreement expressly precludes the UK’s participation in EU computer databases post 
Brexit53.  Without a special agreement the UK would be unable to access EURAMED.54  We 
would be excluded from existing vigilance systems. The decisions made by notified bodies 
would no longer be automatically recognised in other EU member states as we would have 
third country status at that point.  Thus attaining an additional specific agreement concerning 
medical devices is likely to be of great importance. 
 
Secondly, there is the question of compliance with new EU law provisions during the 
transition period. This is a major concern regarding medical devices and it is likely to come 
into sharp relief because  two new EU Regulations have come into force to replace the 
existing Devices Directives.  The new EU Regulations which are due to be implemented post  
March 2019  are Regulation EU 2017/745 of the European Parliament and the Council of 5th 
April 2017 on medical devices55 and Regulation (EU) 2017/746 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 5 April 2017 on in vitro diagnostic medical devices56.   If we move into 
transition then we will have to comply with the medical devices Regulation which is due to 
be implemented in 2020. In contrast the In Vitro regulation does not have to be implemented 
                                                            
53 Article 7 Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community highlighting the progress 
made (coloured version) in the negotiation round with the UK of 16-19 March 2018. 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/draft_agreement_coloured.pdf 
Origin: 
54 Article 7 of the Draft Withdrawal Agreement will exclude the UK from EU computer databases- and this will 
apply unless there is a specific agreement. 
55 Regulation EU  2017/745  of the European Parliament and the Council of 5th April 2017 on medical devices 
amending  Directive 2001/83/EC,  Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 and Regulation (EC) No  1223/2009 and 
repealing Council Directives  90/ 385/ EEC and  93/42/EEC. 
56 Regulation (EU) 2017/746 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2017 on in vitro 
diagnostic medical devices and repealing Directive 98/79/EC and Commission Decision 2010/227/EU 
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until 2022. But if we were within a transitional period we would be expected to comply with 
the Regulations as will become evident without a specific agreement with the EU  concerning 
the devices Regulations we will not be able to be fully  compliant with them. A specific deal 
concerning devices therefore becomes critically important. 
 
First what are the differences between the existing  Directives and the new Regulations? 
What is notable is that they build upon the approach taken by the Directives while at the same 
time evolving and tightening the regulatory processes.  As with the Directives the final form 
of the Regulations can be very much seen as a compromise between considerations of 
business as well as regulation. The Commission stated in the proposal that such regulation 
“Should be supportive of innovation and the competitiveness of the medical device 
industry and should allow rapid and cost- efficient market access for innovative 
medical devices, to the benefit of patients and healthcare professionals’57. 
 
In some ways the new Regulations are as striking for what they do not change as what they 
do. As was seen above there have been concerns as to the lack of an overarching body at EU 
level providing regulation for medical devices.  Such a role could have been given to the 
EMA thus combining both pharmaceuticals and medical devices. This approach would have 
been welcomed by many health professionals, academics and those from the patient 
community. It could have facilitated safety oversight which is something of particular 
importance given recent controversies such as PiP.  However such a new role for the EMA 
was strenuously opposed by industry and the notified bodies themselves. It was argued that as 
approval once given by a notified body for a medical device was valid across the whole of 
Europe then the need for approval by a central body as in the case of the centralised drug 
                                                            
57 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on Medical Devices, and amending Directive 2001/ 83/ 
EC, Regulation (EC) No 178/ 2002 and Regulation (EC) No 1223/ 2009, COM(2012) 542 final, at 2 
20 
 
approval procedure operated through the EMA was unnecessary.  Moreover detailed central 
regulation would have also involved considerable de-coupling from private actors and also 
extensive investment at EU level in the process of medical devices oversight- something 
which as we shall see below appears not to be entirely forthcoming.  
 
Rather than a wholly radical reframing  of the law the Regulations build upon the current  
approach with  continued requirements  for CE marks58,  the use of notifiable bodies and an 
oversight body for notifiable bodies at member state level. However in some respects they do 
expand the scope of regulation.  Critically higher risk devices such as those in Class C III for 
medical devices will now be subject to much stricter pre-market review than was the case.  
For in vitro devices some 80-90% will now need to be subject to a conformity assessment59.  
Manufacturers will have to supply information drawn from systematic clinical investigations 
to Notified Bodies. These are required to identify the safety and the performance of the 
device and in addition have the task of establishing its “clinical benefit”.  “Clinical benefit” is 
defined as being positive impact of a device on an individual’s health which is determined by 
reference to what are meaningful, measurable, and patient-relevant clinical outcomes.  For 
some time there has been concern in relation to the safety of certain cosmetic procedures, 
notably the use of facial fillers.  Certain new aesthetic devices which have the same risk 
profile and characteristics as medical devices are now included under the Regulations. Where 
products combine medicinal product and devices then these will also now need to be assessed 
under the marketing authorisation criteria for medicinal products. 
 
                                                            
58 Article 20. 
59 Annex VIII of the Medical Devices Regulation and In Vitro Devices Regulation. 
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In the past there has been concern in relation to the diversity in standards applied when 
assessing medical devices.60 The Regulations are driving towards alignment of approach. The 
EU Commission is to establish panels of experts to advise on whether a high risk device 
should be approved who will be organised through the EU Joint Research Centre, a specialist 
EU research unit based in Ispra in Italy. 61 The expert panels will operate on an ad hoc basis 
and will be comprised of  volunteers. Concerns remain as to whether sufficient resources will 
ultimately be devoted to this task  and how effective these panels will be.62 As Professor Alan 
Fraser commented in evidence to the House of Commons Health Select Committee in 
January 2018 the group in DG Grow (Directorate General for the Internal Market, Industry, 
Entrepreneurship and SMEs)  concerned with devices and the staff at the Joint Research 
Centre are currently limited in number 
“Together, however, these two groups have few staff dedicated to medical devices 
(recently the total was less than 15 whole-time equivalents, but it has been projected 
to increase to more than 30) and their number includes very few technical specialists 
(recently, there were only 2 medical doctors).”63 
 
 In addition while panel’s advice will be published it will not be binding- merely advisory. 
The Regulation also establishes a Medical Devices Co-ordination Group to work at EU level. 
It will be able to invite organisations to participate and can invite organisations representing 
medical professional bodies as observers. As the current arrangements for transition stand 
whether we even if the UK leaves in December 2020 from March 2019 itself   it will be 
                                                            
60 See Hodges n.18 supra. 
61 See further A.G. Fraser “Medical Devices and Evidence-Based Clinical Practice”  Healthmanagement.org 
62 See discussion in P. Szymanski, I. Leggeri, J. Kautzner and A.G. Fraser “The new European regulatory 
framework for medical devices: opportunities for engagement by electrophysiologists” (2017) Europace 1. 
63 See note 28supra. 
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excluded from such agencies and expert bodies unless it is “exceptionally” invited to attend 
on a “case by case” basis64. 
 
A new procedure has been developed to deal with cases where it is intended to undertake 
clinical assessments in more than one member state.  This will work initially on a voluntary 
basis but seven years from the implementation of the Regulation will become binding.  This 
will enable a single application to be made for assessment something which potentially will 
work towards greater centralisation and standardisation of processes concerning medical 
devices than exists at present.  This would potentially provide the first steps towards aligning 
the structure of centralised processes for drugs and for devices.  
 
The new Regulations also use  common EU regulatory approach in the area of health law that 
of  the “qualified person65.  Manufacturers must ensure that a person is responsible for 
regulatory compliance, conformity and post market surveillance.66 This person is required to 
have specific expertise including the requisite university level academic qualifications and 
scientific  or regulatory experience.67. In the case of very small businesses they will not have 
to have such a person on their staff but they will need to have access to them.68 Alignment 
with EU standards would require such persons to be employed post Brexit. But if the UK 
                                                            
64 Article 7 Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community highlighting the progress 
made (coloured version) in the negotiation round with the UK of 16-19 March 2018. 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/draft_agreement_coloured.pdf,   Article 12(4). 
 
 
65 C/f e.g. approach in relation to the regulation of pharmaceuticals, blood/tissue and cells/organs. 
 
66 Article 15.  
67 Article 15 (1).  
68 Article 15(3). 
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leaves the EU it is possible that some existing notified bodies in the UK may decide to 
relocate and as a result those individuals with highly specialised qualifications in this area 
may also decide to seek employment in notified bodies in other EU member states. This 
could adversely impact on the operation of such bodies and their business models. 
  
 A further concern raised in relation to the safety of devices is what would happen when 
things went wrong and the nature of liability of manufacturers for their devices, something 
brought into sharp focus with PiP and other ongoing litigation.    The new devices 
Regulations introduce the role of the “sponsor” something which has been included in the 
scrutiny of clinical trials on medicinal products both in the original EU Clinical Trials 
Directive and also the new Clinical Trials Regulation69. The sponsor is  a “back stop” in 
terms of liability and of accountability. The Regulations also require that there is the need for 
sufficient financial coverage in relation to manufacturers’ potential liability70. These are 
notable steps forward but they do not provide a panacea.  There is no requirement for a 
Member State to set up a specific compensatory system in relation to the potential harms 
resulting from such medical devices.  This is an issue which does require greater 
consideration at domestic and EU level71.  
 
The Regulations include a range of other new safety related measures including requiring  
manufacturers to produce an annual safety report along with tighter reporting timescales for 
vigilance information72.    Traceability is another common regulatory strategy utilised in 
                                                            
69 See T.K. Hervey and J.V. McHale European Health Law: Themes and Implications (Cambridge: CUP, 2015). 
70 Article 10 of the Medical Devices Regulation and In Vitro Devices Regulation. 
71 See further K. Watson and R. Kottenhagen “Medical Liability in Europe” in A.den Exter (eds) European 
Health Law (Maklu 2017). 
72 Chapter VII, Section 1 and 2 of the Medical Devices Regulation and In Vitro Devices Regulation. 
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European Health law. Tracking and tracing is used in the context of tobacco regulation and in 
relation to tissue and cells through the Single European Code enabling identification of 
material73. This approach is now being introduced in relation to medical devices. Distributors 
and importers are required to co-operate with manufacturers in relation to the traceability of 
devices.74  In addition there will be a unique device identification (UDI) system to enable the 
traceability of devices75 linked to a new UDI database accessible to the public free of 
charge.76 Manufacturers will be required to include devices, other than custom made devices, 
in this database77. Without a specific agreement the UK would not have access to this 
database. 
 
The existing EUDRAMED approach will be continued and extended through   an expanded 
computer database78. This will enable information to be added in relation to the registration 
of devices, economic operators, UDI’s, notified bodies and   clinical investigations etc.  There 
will also be a new central registration database which will be inter-operable with the new 
Clinical Trials Database which is being introduced in 2019 as part of the implementation of 
the new EU Clinical Trial Regulation which is replacing the EU Clinical Trials Directive 
which currently regulates trials on medicinal products. This bringing together at least one 
further part of pharmaceutical regulatory approaches can be seen as symbolically very 
important. While devices for many years have been treated separately and while the EMEA is 
not a central regulator nonetheless this in the future may be regarded as an important step to 
bring the regulation of pharmaceuticals and devices together. Again the UK will not have 
                                                            
73 Commission Directive (EU) 2015/565 amended Directive 2006/86/EC as regards certain technical 
requirements for the coding of human tissues and cells, 9 April 2015. 
74 Article 25.  
75 Article 27. 
76 Article 28. 
77 Article 29. This is the same approach as has been taken in relation to tissue and cells via the Single European 
Code. 
78 Article 33. 
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access to these new databases without a specific agreement being negotiated to apply after we 
leave the EU. 
 
One feature of pharmaceutical regulation has long been that of patient information. The 
Pharmaceutical Directives led to information being provided to patients via information 
sheets having to be included in marketed packs of medicines79. Greater information provision 
can be seen as a means of facilitating patient consent to treatment- something which at EU 
level is included as requirement in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.80 This approach is 
now being developed in relation to medical devices through the requirement of the provision 
of an “Implant card”81. This will provide information regarding implantable medical devices 
for patients. It can be seen not only as following the trend in pharmaceuticals but also the lack 
of information provided in the past to patients with PiP implants.  Patients will be given 
enhanced information regarding technical specifications including information in relation to 
the UDI, the serial number of the device, whether devices will be affected by security 
scanners and the life of the device itself. Information is to be made available in a 
comprehensible manner, updated as needed and will be available to patients via a website. 
82This can be seen as a very  important development for patients particularly also in the light 
of the recent confirmation from the Supreme Court in Montgomery v Lanarkshire that 
informed consent is part of English law and that a dialogue between doctor and patient is a 
necessary part of this83. It can be argued that disclosure of the risks of treatment should 
include such information in relation to technical specifications.  The implant card can be seen 
                                                            
79 Directive 2001/83/EC, Articles 58-60. 
80 Article 3(2). 
81 Article 18. 
82 Article 18(1) (d). 
83 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11; see further R. Heywood. “R.I.P. SIDAWAY: 
Patient-Oriented Disclosure- A standard worth waiting for?”(2015)23(3) Medical Law Review 455. 
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as something which can effectively be built into the consent process. The EU’s engagement 
with and requirement of provision of such enhanced information to patients can be seen as 
framing in the future judicial understanding of what a responsible patient and what this 
particular patient would want to know about the implications of their medical treatment 
where that treatment includes a medical device. Both implementation of these provisions 
along with continued future alignment can be seen as particularly important to ensure that 
patient choice is facilitated in the future.  
 
What will be the impact of Brexit upon UK implementation of these new EU Regulations? In 
the case of a Brexit transition period the UK would need to align and participate with these 
developments concerning the general Devices Regulation due to be fully implemented in 
2020 though not the In Vitro Devices Regulation which will only be fully implemented after 
2022. There is a further complexity here which is that at the present time the MHRA has 
already advised that as it is the case that the Regulations are in force, albeit full 
implementation is not for some time some firms may decide to have their devices approved 
under the new Regulations84.   
This however only takes the implementation of medical devices so far.  As we have seen 
unless there is a specific agreement either in relation to the transition period and /or 
subsequently then the UK stands to lose a range of benefits which  it currently possess and 
which  it would have normally have had access to through the implementation of the new 
Regulations.   
 
                                                            
84 https://www.gov.uk/guidance/medical‐devices‐eu‐regulations‐for‐mdr‐and‐ivdr 
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What could then be done to address this issue? The July  2018 White Paper suggests the 
prospect of an ongoing Association Arrangement between the UK and the EU with provision 
for “regular dialogue between UK and EU leaders and ministers, commensurate with the 
depth of the future relationship and recognising the significance of each other’s global 
standing”. It is envisaged that in some situations the UK will remain part of a “Common 
rulebook” so that products should only have to be tested in one market –UK or EU to be 
recognised.  The intention that this would be accompanied by adherence to compliance 
frameworks.”85 The 2018 White Paper also makes reference to conformity assessments and 
necessary labels/marks which would it appears include the C.E. marking. It is also envisaged 
that conformity assessment bodies would be accredited and there would be adherence to 
manufacturing and quality assurance processes. The White Paper also proposes continued 
recognition of approvals completed before the end of the implementation period itself.86  
 
This approach appears to be in line with  that of “mutual recognition”. Switzerland provides 
one example of a non-EU member state where there is agreement to facilitate regulatory 
alignment in relation to medical devices. A mutual recognition agreement operates by setting 
out conditions under which  the non EU country will accept conformity assessment results  
undertaken by EU conformity assessment bodies to show compliance with the non EU 
members country and vice versa.87  Such agreements include relevant lists of designated 
laboratories, inspection bodies and conformity assessment bodies in both the EU and the third 
country.  There are also mutual recognition agreement (MRA) for medical devices between 
the EU and Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) of Australia, and with New Zealand 
                                                            
85 Note 51 supra at para 28. 
86 Note 51 supra at para 31. 
87 Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on mutual recognition in relation 
to conformity assessment - Final Act - Joint Declarations - Information relating to the entry into force of the 
seven Agreements with the Swiss Confederation in the sectors free movement of persons, air and land transport, 
public procurement, scientific and technological cooperation, mutual recognition in relation to conformity 
assessment, and trade in agricultural products, OJ L 114, 30.4.2002, p. 369–429. 
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and Canada. This does depend upon negotiations and consequent financial agreements 
reached in relation to access. It remains uncertain as to whether the EU will be prepared to 
support this type of agreement. Nor does it seem aligned with the approach currently sought 
by the UK which appears to be a sectoral deal hybrid approach which would enable us to 
retain involvement with the EMA and consequent participation in EU databases etc.  Thus 
while the UK appears to be moving in this direction as to how it wants to proceed in 
negotiations whether this option will prove realistic to attain is very unclear. 
 
There are as have been outlined a myriad of remaining uncertainties dependant not only on 
the negotiations but also on the willingness of the UK Government to continue to align longer 
term with the regulatory standards in this area.  Medical devices regulation is currently 
undergoing  major revision. The UK can unilateraly if it chooses align with various parts of 
the new EU medical devices regulations. However without an agreement the UK will be 
excluded from the EU networks, databases and mutual recognition processes and agreements 
between the EU and UK will be  need to cover both transition and post transition for this to 
be the case. It remains of course uncertain whether such an agreement will be possible.  Of 
course some though may see Brexit as an opportunity for regulation to enable the 
establishment of new approaches in this area in the future. The concluding section examines 
whether Brexit could provide potential for a new regulatory approach. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The implications of Brexit for  health law in the UK in general and on medical devices in 
particular are riven with uncertainty88.  Nonetheless there is a possibility that some may see 
the withdrawal from the EU as an opportunity to reframe medical devices regulation and 
indeed rather than reduce regulation see this as having potential to  provide more rigorous 
scrutiny than that currently applied. As noted above the medical devices regulation is 
complex and its effectiveness is a matter of controversy and while reforms are being 
introduced it can be argued that they do not  yet go far enough. If there was a “no-deal 
scenario” this could potentially allow the UK to introduce quite major reforms at domestic 
level. The UK Government could decide that in the light of the complexity of the regulatory 
system and the concerns in relation to safety thrown up by the PiP, metal hip implants and 
vaginal mesh controversies that what is needed is a  radical revision of the system.  They 
could decide to move away from the current de-centralised system with its myriad of private 
“notified bodies and to instead move towards a centralised regulation system. This was 
rejected when the EU considered reform of the various medical devices directives but the UK 
could decide to take this forward at domestic level. Either a new Medical Devices public 
regulatory body could be established89 or alternatively this role could be entrusted to the 
existing Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency. Were the  MHRA to be 
                                                            
88 See also the other papers in this Special Edition. 
89 The notion of a separate EU device regulator was considered by Hodges in 2004 – see note 16 supra   but this 
would develop that idea of a specialist regulator but simply at domestic level. 
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given this role it would of course need to be accompanied with enhanced staffing and 
financing. Giving this task to the MHRA would have the advantage that decisions regarding 
approvals of medical devices were entirely entrusted to an independent regulator rather than a 
commercial company which could help to restore public trust. While this would clearly 
involve fairly extensive costs, particularly in the initial establishment phase, it could be 
argued that these could be seen as appropriately proportionate in terms of ensuring safety in 
relation to medical devices. The new Agency could take forward beneficial aspects of the 
existing EU schemes such as the implant card and  tracking and tracing of products. This 
would not however address the question of reciprocity. Unless there is a separate sectoral 
agreement then the UK would still be excluded from cross-EU recognition of device approval 
and from the ability to share information as part of vigilance activities. Whether access would 
be allowed to the full EU databases themselves remains questionable at present. A new UK 
regulatory scheme  could also address the concerns noted above in relation to compensation 
for medical devices. It  could  for example establish a specific  no fault compensation scheme 
in this area, but in reality given the unwillingness to introduce such schemes generally in the 
UK with very limited exceptions this is unlikely to be taken forward at least in the near 
future90 
 
While such an entire reframing of medical device regulation itself may provide an effective 
solution in the long term there are several reasons why this particular option is very unlikely 
to be taken forward by the UK Government. The first is clearly that of time- unless the clock 
is stopped on Article 50 and/or unless there is a much longer transitional period negotiated 
than currently envisaged by either of the parties to the negotiations then the UK 
Government’s role in relation to regulation up to Brexit will be concentrated on firefighting 
                                                            
90 See further the Vaccine Damage Compensation Act 1979. 
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across a range of fronts. As we have seen in relation to devices and this is a problem across 
all other sectors- not simply health- there are a  huge range of matters which will need to be 
resolved before we leave to ensure effective operations of systems which cannot be resolved 
by the  European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 itself. This is simply not the time for a calm 
and considered thorough domestic overhaul of the medical devices regulatory system. What 
the Government have indicated in the technical notices published in August 2018 in 
preparation for a no-deal scenario is that   they are currently working on contingency plans 
for supply of such devices. 91 It has indicated that in the case of a no-deal arrangement the 
UK will continue to recognise CE marked devices approved for the EU market at least 
initially and there will also be consultation “in due course” as to what happens after this 
initial arrangement92.  Moreover the MHRA would not be able to provide oversight for 
notified bodies as at present. It  is intended the MHRA would take over national decisions as 
to post market surveillance. The intention seems very much for an approach at least initially 
of a holding operation and continuity. 
 
Secondly, even if time were not the issue it currently is there would be a further practical 
problem here. There has been a steady trend over the last two decades by UK Governments to 
reduce the number of Arms Lengths bodies as a means of reducing cost93. This current 
Government has shown no signs of reversing this trend, nor is it noted for taking forward the 
introduction of new regulatory regimes in the area of health care, in contrast to the previous 
Labour Government with e.g. its introduction of ground breaking regulation in the area of 
                                                            
91  Department of Health and Social Care Guidance  Medicines Supply Contingency Planning Programme : 
Guidance for marketing authorisation holders in the event of a no-deal Brexit, 23rd August 2018, 
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/medicines-supply-contingency-planning-programme 
92  Department of Health and Social Care Guidance  How medicines, medical devices and clinical trials would 
be regulated if there’s no Brexit deal August 23rd 2018. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/how-
medicines-medical-devices-and-clinical-trials-would-be-regulated-if-theres-no-brexit-deal/how-medicines-
medical-devices-and-clinical-trials-would-be-regulated-if-theres-no-brexit-deal- accessed 7th September 2018. 
93 Department of Health Liberating the NHS Report of the Arm’s Length Bodies Review (DOH, 2010). 
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human material through the Human Tissue Act 2004. Without the necessary political will the 
prospect of the creation of alternative regulatory bodies and bespoke new innovative 
regulatory structures in relation to medical devices is likely to simply remain within the pages 
of academic journals and not to enter the statute books.  
 
The best case scenario at present to help to reduce future risks to patient safety will be for the 
UK to align with the new Medical Devices Regulations. This will require active continued 
alignment during the transitional period in relation to the General Devices Regulation. In the 
subsequent period after transition it would be necessary for the UK to ensure compliance with 
the new In Vitro Regulation which is due to be in force in 2020. In addition the UK 
government should explore the prospect for a sectoral deal relating to devices and 
pharmaceuticals. Given the existing EU  negotiation strategy this may be prove ultimately 
impossible or if that is unsuccessful a mutual recognition agreement. It should also attempt to 
ensure ongoing liaison with the Joint Research Centre and Expert Working Groups 
developing standards in this area and seek an observer role on the new Medical Devices 
Coordination Group which the EU is establishing.  Such proactive steps to facilitate 
regulation are critical. As we have seen in relation to PiP, vaginal mesh and metal hip 
implants we simply cannot afford to be complacent about the risks that medical devices can 
pose to patients.  The recent EU initiatives demonstrate there is a real need to ensure that 
standards are not reduced.   As elsewhere patient safety is a critical factor in a healthy Brexit.  
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